Defeating Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy in Iraq

Creating an insurgency is easier than fighting against one in Iraq, particularly if the grievances used to justify violence remain unaddressed by the Iraqi government.

One such grievance comes from tribal leaders who are ignored by the Iraqi government. Influence, or "wasita," is crucial for tribal leaders to ensure that they receive their share of resources from the government. Tribal leaders who are ignored by the government are shamed, and their legitimacy as sheikhs is threatened. Amongst the sheikh's many responsibilities is to ensure that his tribe is secure, prosperous, and growing. He also must ensure that his tribe is strong and can defend its territories from neighboring tribes who may wish to take resources from his tribe. If the government doesn't recognize a sheikh, what does that say to the sheikh's tribesmen? If the sheikh isn't important, then just how important is the tribesman? What can the tribesmen expect from the government if it doesn't recognize and communicate with his sheikh? Is this the message that the Iraqi government should be sending to its citizens?

When the government recognizes sheikhs from one tribe or sub tribe, and not the others, they are influencing the balance of power between and within tribes in a manner that may not be controllable. This is unwise policy, and has led to disaster for every state in the Middle East in modern times. Tribal leadership has a choice when it comes to its relationship with the state - they can defend it and stabilize it, or they can undermine it in a larger effort to destroy it. Tribal leaders will only defend the state if they have a real stake in it, which is to say, that the state provides vital resources to the tribes so that they can live on the same level as others. And yes, they will always want more.

'Abbas Al-'Azzawi, a great Iraqi scholar and tribal advocate stated "that which is ignored can't be healthy." His words that were written more than 60 years ago are still true today. Ignoring, or worse yet shunning tribal leaders is foolish.

We can't force the Iraqi government to adopt wise policies - it is populated with many politicians who, like many politicians in every other country, are greedy, self-serving, and corrupt. Iraqi politicians are fighting a great game to serve themselves a slice of oil money pie. However, the US has a military presence in Iraq that can execute wise policies. Our military leaders may not be great diplomats, but they are loyal, honorable, dutiful, and respectful. They understand integrity. Our military can fill the communication vacuum between the Iraqi government and the roughly 80% of tribal leader that are still unrecognized. If they don't, then Al-Qaeda eventually will. As I mentioned in previous articles, Al-Qaeda's senior leadership is strategically savvy. We must be as well.

I suggest that the Army open the doors to tribal leadership from all tribes and sub tribes. Vet their backgrounds, establish who's who, and listen to them. Use the Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix and Sub Tribal Index to figure out where the sheikh is located in the tribal hierarchy, and correctly assess his potential power and influence. Never ignore a tribal leader, regardless of how small his sub tribe is. Find those who wish to create security, and empower them to do so. Encourage sheikhs to fulfill their historic roles as resolvers of disputes, keepers of the peace in their areas, and wise leaders. Empower them to do so. Test them often and continuously, but in a respectful and humble manner. We are to be their guests, and honest brokers who are there to explore mutual interests, of which there are many.

Tribes clash over resources, yet the US brings a tremendous amount of resources to the table. We can use our resources to create peaceful competition between all tribal leaders to secure their areas and wholeheartedly participate in the reconstruction process. The winner? The Iraqi people. The losers? Religious extremists! They don't have the resources that tribes need (unless they take over the Iraqi government).

Also, I think we need to cast off the image of being occupiers, and instead be their guests. We are already defending them and ourselves, with lives of our soldiers. I think tribal leaders will work with us if we treat them appropriately - with humility and respect. Many already are joining hands with our military for the sake of Iraqis, but there are at least 4500 sub tribes, and not all are participating yet. Tribal engagement for the counterinsurgent in Iraq is a gargantuan task. We have to overcome 5 years of global mind conditioning directed at showing how bad America is because we occupy Iraq. If we came as occupiers, perhaps through effective tribal engagement, we can leave as honored guests who will be welcome visitors in the future?

Tribal engagement is probably the most fundamental and important concept counterinsurgent operations in Iraq. Sheikhs, who are crux of tribal engagement strategies, have secular interests, and they are very concerned about their tribes and families. It follows that we should be concerned with sheikhs from all levels of the tribes. It boils down to this: Al-Qaeda doesn't have many resources, and they have kill lots of tribesmen. They also siphon leadership away from the tribal sheikh.

We have lots of resources, and we are still too lethal. Tribal engagement may enable us to drastically reduce military operations. Then, we can become resource allocators in Iraq instead of policemen. By empowering sheikhs through security arrangments, reconstruction, and resource allocation, we show tribesmen that we sincerely want them to live.

After a few years of tribal engagement along the lines described above, we can drastically reduce our troop presence. There is no fast forward button on this though - it's going to take many years.

When we ignore sheikhs, we dishonor them and open the door for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to co-opt disenfranchised sub tribes into the insurgency. Al-Qaeda's tribal engagement policy is easy - find which tribal leaders hate the United States, bring them money and weapons, train their men, and execute terrorist operations. Their job is small scale, and can be executed with minimal resources.

Our job is harder - we have to find and establish friendly relationships with all tribal leaders and thus prevent the occurrence of communication vacuums. It's a large scale job that is going to entail a lot of forgiving and forgetting what has happened over the last five years, especially with many Sunni tribes.

Conversations with sheikhs, backed up with good will, cooperation and follow through on the ground will save American and Iraqi lives. But, we must destroy the image of ourselves as occupiers, and start acting like guests that bring life-giving resources. It is, after all, their country, so if we're going to be there, we might as well live up to our forefathers' legacies in Europe and Japan.

I think we need to reintroduce ourselves to Iraqis, but not like politicians reintroduce themselves over and over again to America. We need to be much more genuine and sincere - it's a matter of life and death. History is watching.

Tribes and Politics

Here's an example of how to create problems:

Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "Welcome, sheikhs of the ((Al-Jubur)), ((Al-'Ubayd)), and ((Al-'Aza)).

Sheikhs: We welcome you, as well, respected Sir. We have come to ask if you have come here as a guest or as an occupier. If you say that you are our guests, we will defend you with our lives. If you say you are occupiers, then we will fight you until we are dead.

Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "We are occupiers."
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Something like the above conversations actually happened sometime in April of 2003.

I stood behind our officers for five years as an enlisted person, and I support them to this day with all of my efforts. With that being written, I have some criticisms that I intend to be constructive.

I have no idea what the CPA was trying to do by offending the sheikhs. The removal of Saddam and his government from power created a huge power vacuum, and we needed somebody other than Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to fill that vacuum.

What was the CPA thinking? How many lives might have been saved if we had allowed the sheikhs to fill that power vacuum while we rebuilt the central government? What would have happened if we had empowered the sheikhs to fulfill their historic role as keepers of the peace and settlers of disputes?

This is not the President's fault. I suspect it might not be entirely Paul Bremer's fault. I am done blaming people, as this is most irresponsible.

Rather, I suggest that we really start taking advantage of working with tribal leadership. It's going to cost money, but I guarantee that it will be cheaper than bailing out Wall Street.

Whose lives have been saved lately by Wall Street, anyway?

Tribal leadership has very secular and material interests to deal with. We as Americans can help in that regard, and from a strategic perspective it may help achieve many of our benevolent objectives in Iraq.

By honoring these sheikhs, we may find ourselves in the position of being able to withdraw from Iraq having left it in a better condition than it was before we came. Thus, we might leave Iraq with our honor.

"The mind is for seeing, the heart is for listening." ----Arabic Proverb

Will Hubris Blind Us Again?

Al-Qaeda is run by very strategically savvy individuals. They are not stupid, and they are not to be underestimated. Al-Qaeda would like nothing less than for us to become drunk on what seems like victory to us in Iraq to ignoring the circumstances that can lead to failure and defeat on the global stage, including but not limited to Afghanistan.

You see, they know that when we claim victory, egos expand, and medals get pinned on swollen chests. We slap each other on the back and talk about the good old days of Abu Musa'ab Al-Zarqawi and the Islamic State of Iraq.

Al-Qaeda's leaders know that many Americans will rush to claim their share of the glory, and even politicians who were calling for pullouts a few months ago will agree that "the surge worked," and when they get into office, they can "bring home the troops" while claiming that they brought "victory to the American people in our time" in spite of the perceived errors of our current commander in chief.

With all of the dopamine running rampant in our leadership's brains, it will be easy for us to let our guards down in Iraq, thinking that the fight left and went to Afghanistan to fester there. We can really sock it to Al-Qaeda, can't we? Just one more country to go and Al-Qaeda is done! Oh, really?

Al-Qaeda is fighting a global jihad. That means car bombs in places where we don't have 150,000 troops, like Yemen or Pakistan.

The real war is that of ideas, and the battleground is our minds. Al-Qaeda's leadership understands this, and has taken into account material setbacks in Iraq and everywhere else they operate. Assuredly they have contingency plans. It takes a long time to condition minds, and what is a few decades to a Jihadist?

The material fight is wherever they can create instability and make headlines in the newspapers. Let's not think that Zawahiri and his friends are content to rot in caves in Northwestern Pakistan or wherever they are. They'd like to bring death and destruction to your neighborhood, or at least to your newspaper. It's the nature of the monster that they are. They know that they can't win militarily - but they can win in the press and on the global stage. This is just another dramatic act in the play for them.

You'd think we know these things - didn't we fund and arm them to fight against the Soviets in the 1980's? Al-Qaeda's idea of a war lasts 100 years. Our military leaders think that they can be fought and won in 12 month deployments, and our politicians think that the global war on terror will disappear when the messiah becomes president of the United States of America. Do you believe in change that much? Ayman Al-Zawahiri has a cave in Pakistan that he would like to sell you if you believe in change as much as he believes in his cause.

Let's not fall asleep and dream that we are victorious against Al-Qaeda quite yet. We are in the 3rd inning of a 9 inning game.

The battle for Afghanistan is the fourth inning. Getting Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the fifth inning. The reconstruction, development, and consolidation of Afghanistan are the 6th inning. The seventh through the ninth inning is when Islamic civilization repudiates extremism and denies it a place in their hearts and minds in favor of a better world for all of us.

Which ((Albu 'Ubayd)) are you talking about?

Unfortunately, when dealing with Iraqi Arab sub-tribes, ((Albu 'Ubayd)) is not ((Albu 'Ubayd)). Why? Each Iraqi main tribe consists of sub-tribes of different sizes. Each sub-tribe can consist of sub-tribes that belong to it. Some main tribes, such as the ((Al-Muntafaq)) consist of over 800 sub-tribes! Some of these sub-tribes have exactly the same first name!

Here's most if not all of the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) Iraqi Arab sub-tribes, some of which belong to different main tribes. Others are from the same main tribe, but different branches! Note that each of these sub-tribes has a different tribal name chain. There are six ((Al-Muntafaq)) sub-tribal name chains that begin with ((Albu 'Ubayd)), but each one represents a different sub-tribe.

((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Husayn)) ((Al-Khamis)) ((Al-A’ajib)) ((Bani Hajim)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Mahdi)) ((Albu Mahaydi)) ((Albu Baz)) ((Al-Samara’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Siriya)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Ja’afara)) ((Al-'Ankabi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Kari’at)) ((Al-Luhayb)) ((Al-Juburi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khanif)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khatibat)) ((Al-Ibrahim)) ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Malahma)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Shabana)) ((Al-Akra’a)) ((Al-Shimmari)) ((Al-Ta’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Zur)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Ajil)) aka ((Al-‘Ajili))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))

So what, you may ask? Each has a separate sheikh or mukhtar! These sheikhs and mukhtars are central to our efforts to work with the Iraqi population.

And, let's be careful not confuse them with the ((Al-'Ubayd)) main tribe, with hundreds of sub-tribes of its own!

Be careful navigating the Iraqi Arab tribal networks, because the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) is not the ((Albu 'Ubayd)). In actuality, the Iraq Arab Tribal System is a dizzying collection of groups within groups. Mastering this system is vital to the United States' success in Iraq.

Where Is Prime Minister Nuri ((Al-Maliki))'s real power base?

Academia is still searching for answers as to why Prime Minister Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) was elected. Part of the answer lies in his tribal name chain, which is actually ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)). Another part of the answer lies in the fact that the ((Al-Muntafaq)) confederation is the largest tribal confederation in Iraq. Most academics still think that the ((Al-Dulaymi)) confederation is the largest.

The ((Al-Muntafaq)) has 832 original, non-attached known Iraqi sub-tribes out of the 4492 total in The Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix (TIATM™). The ((Al-Muntafaq)) tribal confederation therefore represents about 18.5% of TIATM™, and it can be assessed that their tribal leadership represents the largest segment of Iraqi society.

Does this mean that approximately one in five Iraqi Arabs is from the ((Al-Muntafaq)) confederation?

The vote that put him in the prime ministership may indeed have been more accurate than the opposition wishes to admit. Most political analysts believe that PM Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) was selected as a compromise candidate due to the fact that he was neither a Sadrist nor a member of SCIRI. While this indeed may be the case, it doesn’t cancel out the fact that the Prime Minister needed a large power base from which to operate. In Iraq, being a member of the largest tribe is certainly a benefit when running for national office and may have been the decisive factor leading to his emergence into the realm of Iraqi national politics.

It bears noting that the ((Al-Tikriti)) confederation, from which sprang the former dictator Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti)), represents about .5% of The Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix(tm). It seems that the 2006 elections were indeed democratic, as one of the smallest Arab tribal confederations in Iraq was replaced by the ((Al-Muntafaq)) confederation, which is the largest.

The Iraqi Arab Tribal System - A Reference for Social Scientists, Analysts and Tribal Engagement