Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy - Continued

There are two things that I have been thinking about lately, the first of which is how to connect Iraq's tribal society and its most organic political actors, who are shaykhs, to the government? It is assumed that this is an important thing to do in order to make sure that tribal leadership has an investment in the success of the state, and therefore a substantial reason to support it and act against those who are trying to undermine it. The other thing that I have been thinking about is how insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda lost their huge advantage over the US in tribal engagement, and why they chose strategies that undermined their initially successful efforts in working with the tribes against Coalition Forces.

I assume, also, that the reason Iraqi tribal leaders decided to expel extremists isn't because we as Americans are such a blessing right now to the population. Yes, we did "liberate" the Iraqi people, but we also liberated a lot of political forces that were held in check by Saddam's brutal regime. In the absence of a strong central power in Iraq after the regime fell, all parties concerned with increasing their status began to vie for power, both against Coalition Forces and each other.

This included tribal leaders, who wondered how they would be able to navigate this new political terrain, and potentially gain from it. Al-Qaeda did a much better job of communicating its ideas to tribal leaders immediately after the fall of Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti))'s regime. This is part of the reason that such elements found recruitment to be easy at the time. The other reason was the stream of mistakes that we as Americans committed that might have been avoided if we understood more about Iraq's tribes before the war started. This is both the fault of the US government and so called "Middle Eastern Experts," who either didn't know or deliberately withheld this information. So, the blood of our soldiers isn't just on the American political right, but also on the hands of the politically left American academic community. This is a serious issue, as academics shunned actually studying, defining and applying their allegedly brilliant theories to the realities of tribal societies.

Not all academics fall under this criticism. Falah 'Abd-Al-Jabar and Amatzia Baram both have excellent work that opened the doors to much greater areas of studies in the 1980's and the 1990's. However, their work was scorned and ignored until, of course, a couple of years after the fall of Saddam's regime when we had our collective noses bloodied and wondered why, oh why, are they doing this to us? We're the good guys, for crying out loud!! Meanwhile, American and western academics wasted their energies criticizing the Bush administration, while continuing to insist on approaching all middle eastern issues from the standpoint of western state models and political parties, and the fascinating combinations of resistance movements with charity organizations. Such things have their place, but so many academics have missed the 800 pound gorilla in the arena of middle eastern politics - the tribes. Most still wave their hands at the subject, as if it was passe. Well, if the Tribal Awakening is passe right now, then I suppose some still need to wake up.

And we should be the good guys - history tells us so, right? Can we live up to our forefathers who rebuilt Europe? Are we capable? Are we wise enough? Can we learn about how Iraqi society really works? Or are we going to keep insisting on imposing state models on societies that are by definition unrepresentable in such systems? Is there a better system that the Iraqis can find themselves that is a hybrid of western democracy with certain important institutions that are designed to give a voice to tribal leaders to ensure that Iraq's democracy does indeed come from the forces that are inherent to that of which it consists? If Iraq doesn't fill the gap between western ideas of democracy and what is actually required by the society's constituent political blocs (TRIBES) of the government, then how can anybody expect the Iraqi government to be inclusive to the point that it doesn't create the very instability that it seeks to quash?

I still have discussions with military personnel over how we can move Iraqis away from tribalism. My answer is and will remain that we have to let tribalism play its course so that it can find its rightful place within the society, and that we have to connect the tribes intimately to the government, and that tribal leaders must be included in the government so that tribal values can be represented in the judicial, executive and legislative branches' outputs. Tribalism isn't something that needs to have a lid put on it - it needs to be given conduits in the government through which it can play itself out as a an integral part of the political process. It's the only way that the tribal system can evolve and adjust to the vagaries of modernity, and its also a great way for the Iraqi government to extend itself to every corner of the society. If tribal shaykhs are given what is arguably their rightful places in the government, even if only as members of the judicial branch that are responsible for executing tribal law in the substantial absence of federal or provincial government presence, then this is still potentially a massive contribution to stabilty. The government empowers itself, then, by empowering tribal shaykhs that operate largely outside of federal and provincial control due to the weakness of the government, until they become members of the government themselves, of course.

So, should we support tribalism? The answer lies somewhere between yes and no. I believe that tribes exist for a variety of reasons in Iraq, and until those reasons disappear from the Middle East entirely on their own, we shouldn't expect tribalism to disappear from Iraq. It's not going to happen. So, what can we do? Is it the right of a government to quash tribes? Have such things been successful in the past, or did they just create more grudges, and more instability?

Well, the Iraqi government can make sure that tribal people have an interest in upholding the state. The way that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait handle their tribes is by supporting them with oil money, which is the way that the two governments rent authority from the tribes. This might be the only way to achieve any stability in Iraq, and I certainly hope that the $82 billion dollar surplus that the Iraqi government is operating with is distributed to all of its people in a fashion that is molded using the Kuwaiti and Saudi cast, but is refined to take into account certain unique aspects of Iraqi culture.

Anyway, the Al-Qaeda sympathizers are passing tribal reference materials to each other over the internet on alsahab.com. I suspect they have destructive intentions for using such information, and why else would they have an interest in the tribes, particularly now? Isn't the caliphate supposed to replace these tribes? The best move that the Iraqi government can make now is to rent its authority from the people. Just having a democracy in place isn't enough - the economy is still very weak, unemployment is high, and government services are scarce. Iraq does have a fiscal surplus, though. And I suggest that they should use it to drown out the insurgents once and for all by materially and undeniably showing the people that the government is there to help all Iraqis live. Iraq's government leaders must know that the solution for Iraq's problems are mostly not military. A simple study of the US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that in both positive and negative terms. We are getting it right, now, and thank God for that. Call the disbursement of the surplus to the Iraqi people an economic stimulus, or whatever. Al-Qaeda doesn't have $82 billion dollars, nor bottomless oil wells. These advantages are in the hands of the Iraqi government, and I hope they are deployed well for the sake drowning Al-Qaeda in its failures once and for all.

Of course, its the Iraqi peoples' land, and that is their business. Let's hope they do the right thing. It's their decision - but we all will be affected by the ramifications of just how Iraq's government treats its tribes. Al-Qaeda wants disaffected and disenfranchised tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The Iraqi government will do well to give tribal leaders a very strong interest in continuing to reject AQ's approaches, or the government will inadvertently produce the very forces upon which Al-Qaeda feeds.