One of the questions that a friend of mine asked was how he could tell if "the juice was worth the squeeze" with respect to whether or not a person in Iraq was a "mover and shaker." This is interesting to me, as I am sure that Iraqis themselves are wondering which of us can actually help them, and which of us can't. I wish I had the answer to both issues.
However, this does bring to light an interesting facet that some of us love to delight ourselves with because we think that we understand it. The concept is called "Wasita," which is loosely translated as having somebody important that can help in a pinch. It's much like "guan xi," which in Chinese means having a relationship with someone that is mutually beneficial.
Wasita runs deep. It's more than just having somebody that can help you achieve your earthly aspirations. It's a manifestation of something deep in the Iraqi collective soul.
I could try to write about it - but somebody else did. His name is 'Ali Al-Wardi. Here's my rough translation of pages 16 and 17 of "Lamahat Ijtima'iya," Volume 1. I hope that it brings light to the subject. So, as we look for those who are important in Iraq, who can help us forge stronger ties with Iraqi society, know that they are looking for us, too.
Translation is as follows:
"The Principle of Intercession
It is possible to say that the core of religious ideology in and of itself is centered on the concept of intercession, and thus people turn to the traditions embodied by Prophet’s companions or the members of his family, but they don’t mean to follow their way of life Rather, they mean to acquire intercession on their behalf on the day of resurrection. People believed that the world was temporary, and thus it didn’t deserve the concern of humans. Thus, one should be concerned with other things instead. In their view, the most important means of final victory was to take part in religious rituals on one hand, and to get intercession with God for their loved ones on the other, but as for ethics, good dealings and such, it wasn’t so important because all sins, in their view, would be forgiven by God through intercession for all of those whom God loves without reservation.
The concept of intercession also emanates from the nature of government to which the people were accustomed in ancient times, as perhaps they were used to seeing a person who was close to the sultan as being able to save any person from the noose or make him fortunate materially or financially. This image reflects their religious ideology, and they came to believe that intercession was important with God as well as with their rulers on earth.
This might help us explain many seemingly contradictory social phenomena that riddled the Ottoman age from the perspective of peoples’ popular and governmental concerns – in the building of mosques or holy shrines, and in the extreme care taken in religious rites and demonstrations during times of widespread oppression, looting and violence. The government oppressed people, and people oppressed each other – but everybody was sure that they would go to heaven tomorrow by means of noble intercession.
The most important issue that inspires discord between Sunnis and Shi’ites is the issue of the caliphate – who should have been the caliph after the prophet died, ‘Ali or Abu Bakar? Whoever looks into this issue now from a seemingly neutral point of view feels that it is an issue of the distant past that is no longer important and has no relationship to our current reality. But Iraqis viewed it from another point of view, for they viewed that person A was more worthy than person B to be caliph, and they considered that their judgment with respect to this would benefit them on the day of resurrection because their choice for caliph would intercede on their behalf with God to save them from the torture of hell!
The Shi’ite ideology revolves around the family of Prophet, and thus they feel that they are closer to God and the only ones able to receive salvation and intercession, and for those who wish the benefit of the same should be loyal to them, and thus they will be saved from their enemies. It was not possible to love Shi'ites and love their enemies at the same time. As for the Sunni community, they took another ideological route that is summarized in the saying “We love them all and will be saved by all of them.” Indeed, they love both Abu Bakar and ‘Ali just as they love the Prophet’s companions and his family, and thus they lean towards the belief that they will be saved by all of them.
It is also important to note at this time that the principle of intercession is present in sects and religions of all types, but we can say that this principle is magnified in its influence in the first phase of religious edification, and thus if people are concerned with good works more than intercession, as time passes their stature increases in terms of ancient social values, and thus they are able to overcome the world and forget earthly religion – but then they find themselves indulging in sin and they have no hope of salvation unless they have a man that is favorable to God to intercede on their behalves. For example, if there was a criminal who was about to go to court that had no hope of salvation unless he had an intercessor, he would seek refuge with an intercessor with a request that he intervene, for his fate was in his hands. And he would think that the intercessor would open his heart and be magnanimous, and would intercede no matter what.
It is possible to say that the principle of intercession fulfills a popular psychological need, and that people are satisfied to seek refuge with him for the sake of forgiving their sins only, but they also seek intercession in their material issues, as well, for if a loved one becomes sick, if they were suddenly impoverished or drowning in debt, if a plague broke out, or if they were stricken by some disaster, they hurry to the shrine of one of the Imams or historical figures and cry to him for their salvation. They don’t call upon God for their need because they imagine that God is like a Sultan – one can’t get to him except by means of those who were close to him and who were most uprighteous.
In summary, we can’t understand many religious phenomena in Iraqi society or others that resemble it unless we understand the concept of intercession and the extent to which it has infiltrated the depths of peoples'hearts. They'll deny the effect of this principle in themselves at times, but they are servile to it even if they don’t feel as such, for if not they would feel lost."
End of Translation
So, 'Ali Al-Wardi shows us that wasita is a symptom - not a cause. The cause is that Iraq has traditionally been a very religious society comprised of two differing sects of the same religion, which clash based on succession issues and consequently who is best able to intercede between the people and God to save their souls. Iraqis want someone to intercede on their behalf in heaven, and on earth. So, which Iraqis have wasita with us with respect to material affairs in Iraq?
I think the shaykhs who led and participated fully in the Tribal Awakening earned some wasita. They intervened to save themselves from disaster at the hands of terrorists posing as holy men - and they saved us in the process. In fact, Iraqi shaykhs mostly believe that their fates are intertwined with ours. Can we intercede on their behalf if they need us? I hope so. Can they intercede on our behalf? They did already. We might owe them a big favor, and maybe we are already in the process of delivering on that. It's not fair to say that "giving them their freedom" is enough, and that our work finishes there. Intercession has got to be a two way street with no end.
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy - Continued
There are two things that I have been thinking about lately, the first of which is how to connect Iraq's tribal society and its most organic political actors, who are shaykhs, to the government? It is assumed that this is an important thing to do in order to make sure that tribal leadership has an investment in the success of the state, and therefore a substantial reason to support it and act against those who are trying to undermine it. The other thing that I have been thinking about is how insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda lost their huge advantage over the US in tribal engagement, and why they chose strategies that undermined their initially successful efforts in working with the tribes against Coalition Forces.
I assume, also, that the reason Iraqi tribal leaders decided to expel extremists isn't because we as Americans are such a blessing right now to the population. Yes, we did "liberate" the Iraqi people, but we also liberated a lot of political forces that were held in check by Saddam's brutal regime. In the absence of a strong central power in Iraq after the regime fell, all parties concerned with increasing their status began to vie for power, both against Coalition Forces and each other.
This included tribal leaders, who wondered how they would be able to navigate this new political terrain, and potentially gain from it. Al-Qaeda did a much better job of communicating its ideas to tribal leaders immediately after the fall of Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti))'s regime. This is part of the reason that such elements found recruitment to be easy at the time. The other reason was the stream of mistakes that we as Americans committed that might have been avoided if we understood more about Iraq's tribes before the war started. This is both the fault of the US government and so called "Middle Eastern Experts," who either didn't know or deliberately withheld this information. So, the blood of our soldiers isn't just on the American political right, but also on the hands of the politically left American academic community. This is a serious issue, as academics shunned actually studying, defining and applying their allegedly brilliant theories to the realities of tribal societies.
Not all academics fall under this criticism. Falah 'Abd-Al-Jabar and Amatzia Baram both have excellent work that opened the doors to much greater areas of studies in the 1980's and the 1990's. However, their work was scorned and ignored until, of course, a couple of years after the fall of Saddam's regime when we had our collective noses bloodied and wondered why, oh why, are they doing this to us? We're the good guys, for crying out loud!! Meanwhile, American and western academics wasted their energies criticizing the Bush administration, while continuing to insist on approaching all middle eastern issues from the standpoint of western state models and political parties, and the fascinating combinations of resistance movements with charity organizations. Such things have their place, but so many academics have missed the 800 pound gorilla in the arena of middle eastern politics - the tribes. Most still wave their hands at the subject, as if it was passe. Well, if the Tribal Awakening is passe right now, then I suppose some still need to wake up.
And we should be the good guys - history tells us so, right? Can we live up to our forefathers who rebuilt Europe? Are we capable? Are we wise enough? Can we learn about how Iraqi society really works? Or are we going to keep insisting on imposing state models on societies that are by definition unrepresentable in such systems? Is there a better system that the Iraqis can find themselves that is a hybrid of western democracy with certain important institutions that are designed to give a voice to tribal leaders to ensure that Iraq's democracy does indeed come from the forces that are inherent to that of which it consists? If Iraq doesn't fill the gap between western ideas of democracy and what is actually required by the society's constituent political blocs (TRIBES) of the government, then how can anybody expect the Iraqi government to be inclusive to the point that it doesn't create the very instability that it seeks to quash?
I still have discussions with military personnel over how we can move Iraqis away from tribalism. My answer is and will remain that we have to let tribalism play its course so that it can find its rightful place within the society, and that we have to connect the tribes intimately to the government, and that tribal leaders must be included in the government so that tribal values can be represented in the judicial, executive and legislative branches' outputs. Tribalism isn't something that needs to have a lid put on it - it needs to be given conduits in the government through which it can play itself out as a an integral part of the political process. It's the only way that the tribal system can evolve and adjust to the vagaries of modernity, and its also a great way for the Iraqi government to extend itself to every corner of the society. If tribal shaykhs are given what is arguably their rightful places in the government, even if only as members of the judicial branch that are responsible for executing tribal law in the substantial absence of federal or provincial government presence, then this is still potentially a massive contribution to stabilty. The government empowers itself, then, by empowering tribal shaykhs that operate largely outside of federal and provincial control due to the weakness of the government, until they become members of the government themselves, of course.
So, should we support tribalism? The answer lies somewhere between yes and no. I believe that tribes exist for a variety of reasons in Iraq, and until those reasons disappear from the Middle East entirely on their own, we shouldn't expect tribalism to disappear from Iraq. It's not going to happen. So, what can we do? Is it the right of a government to quash tribes? Have such things been successful in the past, or did they just create more grudges, and more instability?
Well, the Iraqi government can make sure that tribal people have an interest in upholding the state. The way that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait handle their tribes is by supporting them with oil money, which is the way that the two governments rent authority from the tribes. This might be the only way to achieve any stability in Iraq, and I certainly hope that the $82 billion dollar surplus that the Iraqi government is operating with is distributed to all of its people in a fashion that is molded using the Kuwaiti and Saudi cast, but is refined to take into account certain unique aspects of Iraqi culture.
Anyway, the Al-Qaeda sympathizers are passing tribal reference materials to each other over the internet on alsahab.com. I suspect they have destructive intentions for using such information, and why else would they have an interest in the tribes, particularly now? Isn't the caliphate supposed to replace these tribes? The best move that the Iraqi government can make now is to rent its authority from the people. Just having a democracy in place isn't enough - the economy is still very weak, unemployment is high, and government services are scarce. Iraq does have a fiscal surplus, though. And I suggest that they should use it to drown out the insurgents once and for all by materially and undeniably showing the people that the government is there to help all Iraqis live. Iraq's government leaders must know that the solution for Iraq's problems are mostly not military. A simple study of the US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that in both positive and negative terms. We are getting it right, now, and thank God for that. Call the disbursement of the surplus to the Iraqi people an economic stimulus, or whatever. Al-Qaeda doesn't have $82 billion dollars, nor bottomless oil wells. These advantages are in the hands of the Iraqi government, and I hope they are deployed well for the sake drowning Al-Qaeda in its failures once and for all.
Of course, its the Iraqi peoples' land, and that is their business. Let's hope they do the right thing. It's their decision - but we all will be affected by the ramifications of just how Iraq's government treats its tribes. Al-Qaeda wants disaffected and disenfranchised tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The Iraqi government will do well to give tribal leaders a very strong interest in continuing to reject AQ's approaches, or the government will inadvertently produce the very forces upon which Al-Qaeda feeds.
I assume, also, that the reason Iraqi tribal leaders decided to expel extremists isn't because we as Americans are such a blessing right now to the population. Yes, we did "liberate" the Iraqi people, but we also liberated a lot of political forces that were held in check by Saddam's brutal regime. In the absence of a strong central power in Iraq after the regime fell, all parties concerned with increasing their status began to vie for power, both against Coalition Forces and each other.
This included tribal leaders, who wondered how they would be able to navigate this new political terrain, and potentially gain from it. Al-Qaeda did a much better job of communicating its ideas to tribal leaders immediately after the fall of Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti))'s regime. This is part of the reason that such elements found recruitment to be easy at the time. The other reason was the stream of mistakes that we as Americans committed that might have been avoided if we understood more about Iraq's tribes before the war started. This is both the fault of the US government and so called "Middle Eastern Experts," who either didn't know or deliberately withheld this information. So, the blood of our soldiers isn't just on the American political right, but also on the hands of the politically left American academic community. This is a serious issue, as academics shunned actually studying, defining and applying their allegedly brilliant theories to the realities of tribal societies.
Not all academics fall under this criticism. Falah 'Abd-Al-Jabar and Amatzia Baram both have excellent work that opened the doors to much greater areas of studies in the 1980's and the 1990's. However, their work was scorned and ignored until, of course, a couple of years after the fall of Saddam's regime when we had our collective noses bloodied and wondered why, oh why, are they doing this to us? We're the good guys, for crying out loud!! Meanwhile, American and western academics wasted their energies criticizing the Bush administration, while continuing to insist on approaching all middle eastern issues from the standpoint of western state models and political parties, and the fascinating combinations of resistance movements with charity organizations. Such things have their place, but so many academics have missed the 800 pound gorilla in the arena of middle eastern politics - the tribes. Most still wave their hands at the subject, as if it was passe. Well, if the Tribal Awakening is passe right now, then I suppose some still need to wake up.
And we should be the good guys - history tells us so, right? Can we live up to our forefathers who rebuilt Europe? Are we capable? Are we wise enough? Can we learn about how Iraqi society really works? Or are we going to keep insisting on imposing state models on societies that are by definition unrepresentable in such systems? Is there a better system that the Iraqis can find themselves that is a hybrid of western democracy with certain important institutions that are designed to give a voice to tribal leaders to ensure that Iraq's democracy does indeed come from the forces that are inherent to that of which it consists? If Iraq doesn't fill the gap between western ideas of democracy and what is actually required by the society's constituent political blocs (TRIBES) of the government, then how can anybody expect the Iraqi government to be inclusive to the point that it doesn't create the very instability that it seeks to quash?
I still have discussions with military personnel over how we can move Iraqis away from tribalism. My answer is and will remain that we have to let tribalism play its course so that it can find its rightful place within the society, and that we have to connect the tribes intimately to the government, and that tribal leaders must be included in the government so that tribal values can be represented in the judicial, executive and legislative branches' outputs. Tribalism isn't something that needs to have a lid put on it - it needs to be given conduits in the government through which it can play itself out as a an integral part of the political process. It's the only way that the tribal system can evolve and adjust to the vagaries of modernity, and its also a great way for the Iraqi government to extend itself to every corner of the society. If tribal shaykhs are given what is arguably their rightful places in the government, even if only as members of the judicial branch that are responsible for executing tribal law in the substantial absence of federal or provincial government presence, then this is still potentially a massive contribution to stabilty. The government empowers itself, then, by empowering tribal shaykhs that operate largely outside of federal and provincial control due to the weakness of the government, until they become members of the government themselves, of course.
So, should we support tribalism? The answer lies somewhere between yes and no. I believe that tribes exist for a variety of reasons in Iraq, and until those reasons disappear from the Middle East entirely on their own, we shouldn't expect tribalism to disappear from Iraq. It's not going to happen. So, what can we do? Is it the right of a government to quash tribes? Have such things been successful in the past, or did they just create more grudges, and more instability?
Well, the Iraqi government can make sure that tribal people have an interest in upholding the state. The way that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait handle their tribes is by supporting them with oil money, which is the way that the two governments rent authority from the tribes. This might be the only way to achieve any stability in Iraq, and I certainly hope that the $82 billion dollar surplus that the Iraqi government is operating with is distributed to all of its people in a fashion that is molded using the Kuwaiti and Saudi cast, but is refined to take into account certain unique aspects of Iraqi culture.
Anyway, the Al-Qaeda sympathizers are passing tribal reference materials to each other over the internet on alsahab.com. I suspect they have destructive intentions for using such information, and why else would they have an interest in the tribes, particularly now? Isn't the caliphate supposed to replace these tribes? The best move that the Iraqi government can make now is to rent its authority from the people. Just having a democracy in place isn't enough - the economy is still very weak, unemployment is high, and government services are scarce. Iraq does have a fiscal surplus, though. And I suggest that they should use it to drown out the insurgents once and for all by materially and undeniably showing the people that the government is there to help all Iraqis live. Iraq's government leaders must know that the solution for Iraq's problems are mostly not military. A simple study of the US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that in both positive and negative terms. We are getting it right, now, and thank God for that. Call the disbursement of the surplus to the Iraqi people an economic stimulus, or whatever. Al-Qaeda doesn't have $82 billion dollars, nor bottomless oil wells. These advantages are in the hands of the Iraqi government, and I hope they are deployed well for the sake drowning Al-Qaeda in its failures once and for all.
Of course, its the Iraqi peoples' land, and that is their business. Let's hope they do the right thing. It's their decision - but we all will be affected by the ramifications of just how Iraq's government treats its tribes. Al-Qaeda wants disaffected and disenfranchised tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The Iraqi government will do well to give tribal leaders a very strong interest in continuing to reject AQ's approaches, or the government will inadvertently produce the very forces upon which Al-Qaeda feeds.
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