One of the questions that a friend of mine asked was how he could tell if "the juice was worth the squeeze" with respect to whether or not a person in Iraq was a "mover and shaker." This is interesting to me, as I am sure that Iraqis themselves are wondering which of us can actually help them, and which of us can't. I wish I had the answer to both issues.
However, this does bring to light an interesting facet that some of us love to delight ourselves with because we think that we understand it. The concept is called "Wasita," which is loosely translated as having somebody important that can help in a pinch. It's much like "guan xi," which in Chinese means having a relationship with someone that is mutually beneficial.
Wasita runs deep. It's more than just having somebody that can help you achieve your earthly aspirations. It's a manifestation of something deep in the Iraqi collective soul.
I could try to write about it - but somebody else did. His name is 'Ali Al-Wardi. Here's my rough translation of pages 16 and 17 of "Lamahat Ijtima'iya," Volume 1. I hope that it brings light to the subject. So, as we look for those who are important in Iraq, who can help us forge stronger ties with Iraqi society, know that they are looking for us, too.
Translation is as follows:
"The Principle of Intercession
It is possible to say that the core of religious ideology in and of itself is centered on the concept of intercession, and thus people turn to the traditions embodied by Prophet’s companions or the members of his family, but they don’t mean to follow their way of life Rather, they mean to acquire intercession on their behalf on the day of resurrection. People believed that the world was temporary, and thus it didn’t deserve the concern of humans. Thus, one should be concerned with other things instead. In their view, the most important means of final victory was to take part in religious rituals on one hand, and to get intercession with God for their loved ones on the other, but as for ethics, good dealings and such, it wasn’t so important because all sins, in their view, would be forgiven by God through intercession for all of those whom God loves without reservation.
The concept of intercession also emanates from the nature of government to which the people were accustomed in ancient times, as perhaps they were used to seeing a person who was close to the sultan as being able to save any person from the noose or make him fortunate materially or financially. This image reflects their religious ideology, and they came to believe that intercession was important with God as well as with their rulers on earth.
This might help us explain many seemingly contradictory social phenomena that riddled the Ottoman age from the perspective of peoples’ popular and governmental concerns – in the building of mosques or holy shrines, and in the extreme care taken in religious rites and demonstrations during times of widespread oppression, looting and violence. The government oppressed people, and people oppressed each other – but everybody was sure that they would go to heaven tomorrow by means of noble intercession.
The most important issue that inspires discord between Sunnis and Shi’ites is the issue of the caliphate – who should have been the caliph after the prophet died, ‘Ali or Abu Bakar? Whoever looks into this issue now from a seemingly neutral point of view feels that it is an issue of the distant past that is no longer important and has no relationship to our current reality. But Iraqis viewed it from another point of view, for they viewed that person A was more worthy than person B to be caliph, and they considered that their judgment with respect to this would benefit them on the day of resurrection because their choice for caliph would intercede on their behalf with God to save them from the torture of hell!
The Shi’ite ideology revolves around the family of Prophet, and thus they feel that they are closer to God and the only ones able to receive salvation and intercession, and for those who wish the benefit of the same should be loyal to them, and thus they will be saved from their enemies. It was not possible to love Shi'ites and love their enemies at the same time. As for the Sunni community, they took another ideological route that is summarized in the saying “We love them all and will be saved by all of them.” Indeed, they love both Abu Bakar and ‘Ali just as they love the Prophet’s companions and his family, and thus they lean towards the belief that they will be saved by all of them.
It is also important to note at this time that the principle of intercession is present in sects and religions of all types, but we can say that this principle is magnified in its influence in the first phase of religious edification, and thus if people are concerned with good works more than intercession, as time passes their stature increases in terms of ancient social values, and thus they are able to overcome the world and forget earthly religion – but then they find themselves indulging in sin and they have no hope of salvation unless they have a man that is favorable to God to intercede on their behalves. For example, if there was a criminal who was about to go to court that had no hope of salvation unless he had an intercessor, he would seek refuge with an intercessor with a request that he intervene, for his fate was in his hands. And he would think that the intercessor would open his heart and be magnanimous, and would intercede no matter what.
It is possible to say that the principle of intercession fulfills a popular psychological need, and that people are satisfied to seek refuge with him for the sake of forgiving their sins only, but they also seek intercession in their material issues, as well, for if a loved one becomes sick, if they were suddenly impoverished or drowning in debt, if a plague broke out, or if they were stricken by some disaster, they hurry to the shrine of one of the Imams or historical figures and cry to him for their salvation. They don’t call upon God for their need because they imagine that God is like a Sultan – one can’t get to him except by means of those who were close to him and who were most uprighteous.
In summary, we can’t understand many religious phenomena in Iraqi society or others that resemble it unless we understand the concept of intercession and the extent to which it has infiltrated the depths of peoples'hearts. They'll deny the effect of this principle in themselves at times, but they are servile to it even if they don’t feel as such, for if not they would feel lost."
End of Translation
So, 'Ali Al-Wardi shows us that wasita is a symptom - not a cause. The cause is that Iraq has traditionally been a very religious society comprised of two differing sects of the same religion, which clash based on succession issues and consequently who is best able to intercede between the people and God to save their souls. Iraqis want someone to intercede on their behalf in heaven, and on earth. So, which Iraqis have wasita with us with respect to material affairs in Iraq?
I think the shaykhs who led and participated fully in the Tribal Awakening earned some wasita. They intervened to save themselves from disaster at the hands of terrorists posing as holy men - and they saved us in the process. In fact, Iraqi shaykhs mostly believe that their fates are intertwined with ours. Can we intercede on their behalf if they need us? I hope so. Can they intercede on our behalf? They did already. We might owe them a big favor, and maybe we are already in the process of delivering on that. It's not fair to say that "giving them their freedom" is enough, and that our work finishes there. Intercession has got to be a two way street with no end.
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy - Continued
There are two things that I have been thinking about lately, the first of which is how to connect Iraq's tribal society and its most organic political actors, who are shaykhs, to the government? It is assumed that this is an important thing to do in order to make sure that tribal leadership has an investment in the success of the state, and therefore a substantial reason to support it and act against those who are trying to undermine it. The other thing that I have been thinking about is how insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda lost their huge advantage over the US in tribal engagement, and why they chose strategies that undermined their initially successful efforts in working with the tribes against Coalition Forces.
I assume, also, that the reason Iraqi tribal leaders decided to expel extremists isn't because we as Americans are such a blessing right now to the population. Yes, we did "liberate" the Iraqi people, but we also liberated a lot of political forces that were held in check by Saddam's brutal regime. In the absence of a strong central power in Iraq after the regime fell, all parties concerned with increasing their status began to vie for power, both against Coalition Forces and each other.
This included tribal leaders, who wondered how they would be able to navigate this new political terrain, and potentially gain from it. Al-Qaeda did a much better job of communicating its ideas to tribal leaders immediately after the fall of Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti))'s regime. This is part of the reason that such elements found recruitment to be easy at the time. The other reason was the stream of mistakes that we as Americans committed that might have been avoided if we understood more about Iraq's tribes before the war started. This is both the fault of the US government and so called "Middle Eastern Experts," who either didn't know or deliberately withheld this information. So, the blood of our soldiers isn't just on the American political right, but also on the hands of the politically left American academic community. This is a serious issue, as academics shunned actually studying, defining and applying their allegedly brilliant theories to the realities of tribal societies.
Not all academics fall under this criticism. Falah 'Abd-Al-Jabar and Amatzia Baram both have excellent work that opened the doors to much greater areas of studies in the 1980's and the 1990's. However, their work was scorned and ignored until, of course, a couple of years after the fall of Saddam's regime when we had our collective noses bloodied and wondered why, oh why, are they doing this to us? We're the good guys, for crying out loud!! Meanwhile, American and western academics wasted their energies criticizing the Bush administration, while continuing to insist on approaching all middle eastern issues from the standpoint of western state models and political parties, and the fascinating combinations of resistance movements with charity organizations. Such things have their place, but so many academics have missed the 800 pound gorilla in the arena of middle eastern politics - the tribes. Most still wave their hands at the subject, as if it was passe. Well, if the Tribal Awakening is passe right now, then I suppose some still need to wake up.
And we should be the good guys - history tells us so, right? Can we live up to our forefathers who rebuilt Europe? Are we capable? Are we wise enough? Can we learn about how Iraqi society really works? Or are we going to keep insisting on imposing state models on societies that are by definition unrepresentable in such systems? Is there a better system that the Iraqis can find themselves that is a hybrid of western democracy with certain important institutions that are designed to give a voice to tribal leaders to ensure that Iraq's democracy does indeed come from the forces that are inherent to that of which it consists? If Iraq doesn't fill the gap between western ideas of democracy and what is actually required by the society's constituent political blocs (TRIBES) of the government, then how can anybody expect the Iraqi government to be inclusive to the point that it doesn't create the very instability that it seeks to quash?
I still have discussions with military personnel over how we can move Iraqis away from tribalism. My answer is and will remain that we have to let tribalism play its course so that it can find its rightful place within the society, and that we have to connect the tribes intimately to the government, and that tribal leaders must be included in the government so that tribal values can be represented in the judicial, executive and legislative branches' outputs. Tribalism isn't something that needs to have a lid put on it - it needs to be given conduits in the government through which it can play itself out as a an integral part of the political process. It's the only way that the tribal system can evolve and adjust to the vagaries of modernity, and its also a great way for the Iraqi government to extend itself to every corner of the society. If tribal shaykhs are given what is arguably their rightful places in the government, even if only as members of the judicial branch that are responsible for executing tribal law in the substantial absence of federal or provincial government presence, then this is still potentially a massive contribution to stabilty. The government empowers itself, then, by empowering tribal shaykhs that operate largely outside of federal and provincial control due to the weakness of the government, until they become members of the government themselves, of course.
So, should we support tribalism? The answer lies somewhere between yes and no. I believe that tribes exist for a variety of reasons in Iraq, and until those reasons disappear from the Middle East entirely on their own, we shouldn't expect tribalism to disappear from Iraq. It's not going to happen. So, what can we do? Is it the right of a government to quash tribes? Have such things been successful in the past, or did they just create more grudges, and more instability?
Well, the Iraqi government can make sure that tribal people have an interest in upholding the state. The way that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait handle their tribes is by supporting them with oil money, which is the way that the two governments rent authority from the tribes. This might be the only way to achieve any stability in Iraq, and I certainly hope that the $82 billion dollar surplus that the Iraqi government is operating with is distributed to all of its people in a fashion that is molded using the Kuwaiti and Saudi cast, but is refined to take into account certain unique aspects of Iraqi culture.
Anyway, the Al-Qaeda sympathizers are passing tribal reference materials to each other over the internet on alsahab.com. I suspect they have destructive intentions for using such information, and why else would they have an interest in the tribes, particularly now? Isn't the caliphate supposed to replace these tribes? The best move that the Iraqi government can make now is to rent its authority from the people. Just having a democracy in place isn't enough - the economy is still very weak, unemployment is high, and government services are scarce. Iraq does have a fiscal surplus, though. And I suggest that they should use it to drown out the insurgents once and for all by materially and undeniably showing the people that the government is there to help all Iraqis live. Iraq's government leaders must know that the solution for Iraq's problems are mostly not military. A simple study of the US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that in both positive and negative terms. We are getting it right, now, and thank God for that. Call the disbursement of the surplus to the Iraqi people an economic stimulus, or whatever. Al-Qaeda doesn't have $82 billion dollars, nor bottomless oil wells. These advantages are in the hands of the Iraqi government, and I hope they are deployed well for the sake drowning Al-Qaeda in its failures once and for all.
Of course, its the Iraqi peoples' land, and that is their business. Let's hope they do the right thing. It's their decision - but we all will be affected by the ramifications of just how Iraq's government treats its tribes. Al-Qaeda wants disaffected and disenfranchised tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The Iraqi government will do well to give tribal leaders a very strong interest in continuing to reject AQ's approaches, or the government will inadvertently produce the very forces upon which Al-Qaeda feeds.
I assume, also, that the reason Iraqi tribal leaders decided to expel extremists isn't because we as Americans are such a blessing right now to the population. Yes, we did "liberate" the Iraqi people, but we also liberated a lot of political forces that were held in check by Saddam's brutal regime. In the absence of a strong central power in Iraq after the regime fell, all parties concerned with increasing their status began to vie for power, both against Coalition Forces and each other.
This included tribal leaders, who wondered how they would be able to navigate this new political terrain, and potentially gain from it. Al-Qaeda did a much better job of communicating its ideas to tribal leaders immediately after the fall of Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti))'s regime. This is part of the reason that such elements found recruitment to be easy at the time. The other reason was the stream of mistakes that we as Americans committed that might have been avoided if we understood more about Iraq's tribes before the war started. This is both the fault of the US government and so called "Middle Eastern Experts," who either didn't know or deliberately withheld this information. So, the blood of our soldiers isn't just on the American political right, but also on the hands of the politically left American academic community. This is a serious issue, as academics shunned actually studying, defining and applying their allegedly brilliant theories to the realities of tribal societies.
Not all academics fall under this criticism. Falah 'Abd-Al-Jabar and Amatzia Baram both have excellent work that opened the doors to much greater areas of studies in the 1980's and the 1990's. However, their work was scorned and ignored until, of course, a couple of years after the fall of Saddam's regime when we had our collective noses bloodied and wondered why, oh why, are they doing this to us? We're the good guys, for crying out loud!! Meanwhile, American and western academics wasted their energies criticizing the Bush administration, while continuing to insist on approaching all middle eastern issues from the standpoint of western state models and political parties, and the fascinating combinations of resistance movements with charity organizations. Such things have their place, but so many academics have missed the 800 pound gorilla in the arena of middle eastern politics - the tribes. Most still wave their hands at the subject, as if it was passe. Well, if the Tribal Awakening is passe right now, then I suppose some still need to wake up.
And we should be the good guys - history tells us so, right? Can we live up to our forefathers who rebuilt Europe? Are we capable? Are we wise enough? Can we learn about how Iraqi society really works? Or are we going to keep insisting on imposing state models on societies that are by definition unrepresentable in such systems? Is there a better system that the Iraqis can find themselves that is a hybrid of western democracy with certain important institutions that are designed to give a voice to tribal leaders to ensure that Iraq's democracy does indeed come from the forces that are inherent to that of which it consists? If Iraq doesn't fill the gap between western ideas of democracy and what is actually required by the society's constituent political blocs (TRIBES) of the government, then how can anybody expect the Iraqi government to be inclusive to the point that it doesn't create the very instability that it seeks to quash?
I still have discussions with military personnel over how we can move Iraqis away from tribalism. My answer is and will remain that we have to let tribalism play its course so that it can find its rightful place within the society, and that we have to connect the tribes intimately to the government, and that tribal leaders must be included in the government so that tribal values can be represented in the judicial, executive and legislative branches' outputs. Tribalism isn't something that needs to have a lid put on it - it needs to be given conduits in the government through which it can play itself out as a an integral part of the political process. It's the only way that the tribal system can evolve and adjust to the vagaries of modernity, and its also a great way for the Iraqi government to extend itself to every corner of the society. If tribal shaykhs are given what is arguably their rightful places in the government, even if only as members of the judicial branch that are responsible for executing tribal law in the substantial absence of federal or provincial government presence, then this is still potentially a massive contribution to stabilty. The government empowers itself, then, by empowering tribal shaykhs that operate largely outside of federal and provincial control due to the weakness of the government, until they become members of the government themselves, of course.
So, should we support tribalism? The answer lies somewhere between yes and no. I believe that tribes exist for a variety of reasons in Iraq, and until those reasons disappear from the Middle East entirely on their own, we shouldn't expect tribalism to disappear from Iraq. It's not going to happen. So, what can we do? Is it the right of a government to quash tribes? Have such things been successful in the past, or did they just create more grudges, and more instability?
Well, the Iraqi government can make sure that tribal people have an interest in upholding the state. The way that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait handle their tribes is by supporting them with oil money, which is the way that the two governments rent authority from the tribes. This might be the only way to achieve any stability in Iraq, and I certainly hope that the $82 billion dollar surplus that the Iraqi government is operating with is distributed to all of its people in a fashion that is molded using the Kuwaiti and Saudi cast, but is refined to take into account certain unique aspects of Iraqi culture.
Anyway, the Al-Qaeda sympathizers are passing tribal reference materials to each other over the internet on alsahab.com. I suspect they have destructive intentions for using such information, and why else would they have an interest in the tribes, particularly now? Isn't the caliphate supposed to replace these tribes? The best move that the Iraqi government can make now is to rent its authority from the people. Just having a democracy in place isn't enough - the economy is still very weak, unemployment is high, and government services are scarce. Iraq does have a fiscal surplus, though. And I suggest that they should use it to drown out the insurgents once and for all by materially and undeniably showing the people that the government is there to help all Iraqis live. Iraq's government leaders must know that the solution for Iraq's problems are mostly not military. A simple study of the US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that in both positive and negative terms. We are getting it right, now, and thank God for that. Call the disbursement of the surplus to the Iraqi people an economic stimulus, or whatever. Al-Qaeda doesn't have $82 billion dollars, nor bottomless oil wells. These advantages are in the hands of the Iraqi government, and I hope they are deployed well for the sake drowning Al-Qaeda in its failures once and for all.
Of course, its the Iraqi peoples' land, and that is their business. Let's hope they do the right thing. It's their decision - but we all will be affected by the ramifications of just how Iraq's government treats its tribes. Al-Qaeda wants disaffected and disenfranchised tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The Iraqi government will do well to give tribal leaders a very strong interest in continuing to reject AQ's approaches, or the government will inadvertently produce the very forces upon which Al-Qaeda feeds.
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
'Alawite or 'Alawite, Sect or Blood Line?
The following excerpt was translated from 'Abbas Al-'Azzawi's "The Tribes of Iraq," Volume 4, page 229:
"It is difficult to account for the tribes which descend from Imam 'Ali and were born from his wife, the lady Fatima Al-Zahra' and from his children, amongst whom are the Imams Hasan and Al-Husayn. They are noble. The genealogy of those individuals who multiplied both in the cities and in rural areas tends to be kept secret. Their groups are few, and they are not related to either 'Adnanite nor Qahtanite tribes... And in view of the fact that this is kept from the eyes of the people, their status as nobility has increased."
'Azzawi goes on to list the following tribes as being 'Alawite:
1. ((Al-Hadidiyun))
2. ((Al-Samida'a))
3. ((Al-Mashahada)) aka ((Al-Mashhadani))
4. ((Al-Hiyaliyun))
5. ((Al-Na'im))
6. ((Al-Yasir))
7. ((Al-'Anakisha))
8. ((Al-Hasaniya))
9. ((Albu Sa'abir))
10. ((Al-Abi Tabikh))
11. ((Al-Al Sayid Mahdi))
12. ((Al-Zuwayn))
13. ((Al-'Adhariyun))
Of course, tribal affiliation is not to be confused with sect, right? Or, is it?
The 'Alawites of Syria are referred to mostly as a sect, however is it possible that the traditions of the sect are kept within certain tribes and not others? I wouldn't be surprised if that were the case.
Is it possible that Syrian 'Alawite sectarian tribes are related to the 'Alawite tribes of Iraq? This wouldn't surprise me either considering the artificiality of the Iraqi/Syrian border, and the tendency of tribes to ignore borders in general.
Were 'Alawite Iraqi Arab tribes were a part of the sect at some point in time?
I have no idea, but I expect that Iraqi 'Alawite Arab tribes are either Sunni or Shi'ite, and they are not from the 'Alawite sect. So, I'm sticking with the theory that 'Alawite in Iraq means descended from the prophet Muhammad through Imam 'Ali and Fatima al-Zahra' only. And that is subject to change when somebody who knows better shows me.
The problem is that there is so little scholarship available about Iraqi Arab tribes. Does anybody know about scholarship on Syrian tribes?
"It is difficult to account for the tribes which descend from Imam 'Ali and were born from his wife, the lady Fatima Al-Zahra' and from his children, amongst whom are the Imams Hasan and Al-Husayn. They are noble. The genealogy of those individuals who multiplied both in the cities and in rural areas tends to be kept secret. Their groups are few, and they are not related to either 'Adnanite nor Qahtanite tribes... And in view of the fact that this is kept from the eyes of the people, their status as nobility has increased."
'Azzawi goes on to list the following tribes as being 'Alawite:
1. ((Al-Hadidiyun))
2. ((Al-Samida'a))
3. ((Al-Mashahada)) aka ((Al-Mashhadani))
4. ((Al-Hiyaliyun))
5. ((Al-Na'im))
6. ((Al-Yasir))
7. ((Al-'Anakisha))
8. ((Al-Hasaniya))
9. ((Albu Sa'abir))
10. ((Al-Abi Tabikh))
11. ((Al-Al Sayid Mahdi))
12. ((Al-Zuwayn))
13. ((Al-'Adhariyun))
Of course, tribal affiliation is not to be confused with sect, right? Or, is it?
The 'Alawites of Syria are referred to mostly as a sect, however is it possible that the traditions of the sect are kept within certain tribes and not others? I wouldn't be surprised if that were the case.
Is it possible that Syrian 'Alawite sectarian tribes are related to the 'Alawite tribes of Iraq? This wouldn't surprise me either considering the artificiality of the Iraqi/Syrian border, and the tendency of tribes to ignore borders in general.
Were 'Alawite Iraqi Arab tribes were a part of the sect at some point in time?
I have no idea, but I expect that Iraqi 'Alawite Arab tribes are either Sunni or Shi'ite, and they are not from the 'Alawite sect. So, I'm sticking with the theory that 'Alawite in Iraq means descended from the prophet Muhammad through Imam 'Ali and Fatima al-Zahra' only. And that is subject to change when somebody who knows better shows me.
The problem is that there is so little scholarship available about Iraqi Arab tribes. Does anybody know about scholarship on Syrian tribes?
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Defeating Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy in Iraq
Creating an insurgency is easier than fighting against one in Iraq, particularly if the grievances used to justify violence remain unaddressed by the Iraqi government.
One such grievance comes from tribal leaders who are ignored by the Iraqi government. Influence, or "wasita," is crucial for tribal leaders to ensure that they receive their share of resources from the government. Tribal leaders who are ignored by the government are shamed, and their legitimacy as sheikhs is threatened. Amongst the sheikh's many responsibilities is to ensure that his tribe is secure, prosperous, and growing. He also must ensure that his tribe is strong and can defend its territories from neighboring tribes who may wish to take resources from his tribe. If the government doesn't recognize a sheikh, what does that say to the sheikh's tribesmen? If the sheikh isn't important, then just how important is the tribesman? What can the tribesmen expect from the government if it doesn't recognize and communicate with his sheikh? Is this the message that the Iraqi government should be sending to its citizens?
When the government recognizes sheikhs from one tribe or sub tribe, and not the others, they are influencing the balance of power between and within tribes in a manner that may not be controllable. This is unwise policy, and has led to disaster for every state in the Middle East in modern times. Tribal leadership has a choice when it comes to its relationship with the state - they can defend it and stabilize it, or they can undermine it in a larger effort to destroy it. Tribal leaders will only defend the state if they have a real stake in it, which is to say, that the state provides vital resources to the tribes so that they can live on the same level as others. And yes, they will always want more.
'Abbas Al-'Azzawi, a great Iraqi scholar and tribal advocate stated "that which is ignored can't be healthy." His words that were written more than 60 years ago are still true today. Ignoring, or worse yet shunning tribal leaders is foolish.
We can't force the Iraqi government to adopt wise policies - it is populated with many politicians who, like many politicians in every other country, are greedy, self-serving, and corrupt. Iraqi politicians are fighting a great game to serve themselves a slice of oil money pie. However, the US has a military presence in Iraq that can execute wise policies. Our military leaders may not be great diplomats, but they are loyal, honorable, dutiful, and respectful. They understand integrity. Our military can fill the communication vacuum between the Iraqi government and the roughly 80% of tribal leader that are still unrecognized. If they don't, then Al-Qaeda eventually will. As I mentioned in previous articles, Al-Qaeda's senior leadership is strategically savvy. We must be as well.
I suggest that the Army open the doors to tribal leadership from all tribes and sub tribes. Vet their backgrounds, establish who's who, and listen to them. Use the Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix and Sub Tribal Index to figure out where the sheikh is located in the tribal hierarchy, and correctly assess his potential power and influence. Never ignore a tribal leader, regardless of how small his sub tribe is. Find those who wish to create security, and empower them to do so. Encourage sheikhs to fulfill their historic roles as resolvers of disputes, keepers of the peace in their areas, and wise leaders. Empower them to do so. Test them often and continuously, but in a respectful and humble manner. We are to be their guests, and honest brokers who are there to explore mutual interests, of which there are many.
Tribes clash over resources, yet the US brings a tremendous amount of resources to the table. We can use our resources to create peaceful competition between all tribal leaders to secure their areas and wholeheartedly participate in the reconstruction process. The winner? The Iraqi people. The losers? Religious extremists! They don't have the resources that tribes need (unless they take over the Iraqi government).
Also, I think we need to cast off the image of being occupiers, and instead be their guests. We are already defending them and ourselves, with lives of our soldiers. I think tribal leaders will work with us if we treat them appropriately - with humility and respect. Many already are joining hands with our military for the sake of Iraqis, but there are at least 4500 sub tribes, and not all are participating yet. Tribal engagement for the counterinsurgent in Iraq is a gargantuan task. We have to overcome 5 years of global mind conditioning directed at showing how bad America is because we occupy Iraq. If we came as occupiers, perhaps through effective tribal engagement, we can leave as honored guests who will be welcome visitors in the future?
Tribal engagement is probably the most fundamental and important concept counterinsurgent operations in Iraq. Sheikhs, who are crux of tribal engagement strategies, have secular interests, and they are very concerned about their tribes and families. It follows that we should be concerned with sheikhs from all levels of the tribes. It boils down to this: Al-Qaeda doesn't have many resources, and they have kill lots of tribesmen. They also siphon leadership away from the tribal sheikh.
We have lots of resources, and we are still too lethal. Tribal engagement may enable us to drastically reduce military operations. Then, we can become resource allocators in Iraq instead of policemen. By empowering sheikhs through security arrangments, reconstruction, and resource allocation, we show tribesmen that we sincerely want them to live.
After a few years of tribal engagement along the lines described above, we can drastically reduce our troop presence. There is no fast forward button on this though - it's going to take many years.
When we ignore sheikhs, we dishonor them and open the door for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to co-opt disenfranchised sub tribes into the insurgency. Al-Qaeda's tribal engagement policy is easy - find which tribal leaders hate the United States, bring them money and weapons, train their men, and execute terrorist operations. Their job is small scale, and can be executed with minimal resources.
Our job is harder - we have to find and establish friendly relationships with all tribal leaders and thus prevent the occurrence of communication vacuums. It's a large scale job that is going to entail a lot of forgiving and forgetting what has happened over the last five years, especially with many Sunni tribes.
Conversations with sheikhs, backed up with good will, cooperation and follow through on the ground will save American and Iraqi lives. But, we must destroy the image of ourselves as occupiers, and start acting like guests that bring life-giving resources. It is, after all, their country, so if we're going to be there, we might as well live up to our forefathers' legacies in Europe and Japan.
I think we need to reintroduce ourselves to Iraqis, but not like politicians reintroduce themselves over and over again to America. We need to be much more genuine and sincere - it's a matter of life and death. History is watching.
One such grievance comes from tribal leaders who are ignored by the Iraqi government. Influence, or "wasita," is crucial for tribal leaders to ensure that they receive their share of resources from the government. Tribal leaders who are ignored by the government are shamed, and their legitimacy as sheikhs is threatened. Amongst the sheikh's many responsibilities is to ensure that his tribe is secure, prosperous, and growing. He also must ensure that his tribe is strong and can defend its territories from neighboring tribes who may wish to take resources from his tribe. If the government doesn't recognize a sheikh, what does that say to the sheikh's tribesmen? If the sheikh isn't important, then just how important is the tribesman? What can the tribesmen expect from the government if it doesn't recognize and communicate with his sheikh? Is this the message that the Iraqi government should be sending to its citizens?
When the government recognizes sheikhs from one tribe or sub tribe, and not the others, they are influencing the balance of power between and within tribes in a manner that may not be controllable. This is unwise policy, and has led to disaster for every state in the Middle East in modern times. Tribal leadership has a choice when it comes to its relationship with the state - they can defend it and stabilize it, or they can undermine it in a larger effort to destroy it. Tribal leaders will only defend the state if they have a real stake in it, which is to say, that the state provides vital resources to the tribes so that they can live on the same level as others. And yes, they will always want more.
'Abbas Al-'Azzawi, a great Iraqi scholar and tribal advocate stated "that which is ignored can't be healthy." His words that were written more than 60 years ago are still true today. Ignoring, or worse yet shunning tribal leaders is foolish.
We can't force the Iraqi government to adopt wise policies - it is populated with many politicians who, like many politicians in every other country, are greedy, self-serving, and corrupt. Iraqi politicians are fighting a great game to serve themselves a slice of oil money pie. However, the US has a military presence in Iraq that can execute wise policies. Our military leaders may not be great diplomats, but they are loyal, honorable, dutiful, and respectful. They understand integrity. Our military can fill the communication vacuum between the Iraqi government and the roughly 80% of tribal leader that are still unrecognized. If they don't, then Al-Qaeda eventually will. As I mentioned in previous articles, Al-Qaeda's senior leadership is strategically savvy. We must be as well.
I suggest that the Army open the doors to tribal leadership from all tribes and sub tribes. Vet their backgrounds, establish who's who, and listen to them. Use the Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix and Sub Tribal Index to figure out where the sheikh is located in the tribal hierarchy, and correctly assess his potential power and influence. Never ignore a tribal leader, regardless of how small his sub tribe is. Find those who wish to create security, and empower them to do so. Encourage sheikhs to fulfill their historic roles as resolvers of disputes, keepers of the peace in their areas, and wise leaders. Empower them to do so. Test them often and continuously, but in a respectful and humble manner. We are to be their guests, and honest brokers who are there to explore mutual interests, of which there are many.
Tribes clash over resources, yet the US brings a tremendous amount of resources to the table. We can use our resources to create peaceful competition between all tribal leaders to secure their areas and wholeheartedly participate in the reconstruction process. The winner? The Iraqi people. The losers? Religious extremists! They don't have the resources that tribes need (unless they take over the Iraqi government).
Also, I think we need to cast off the image of being occupiers, and instead be their guests. We are already defending them and ourselves, with lives of our soldiers. I think tribal leaders will work with us if we treat them appropriately - with humility and respect. Many already are joining hands with our military for the sake of Iraqis, but there are at least 4500 sub tribes, and not all are participating yet. Tribal engagement for the counterinsurgent in Iraq is a gargantuan task. We have to overcome 5 years of global mind conditioning directed at showing how bad America is because we occupy Iraq. If we came as occupiers, perhaps through effective tribal engagement, we can leave as honored guests who will be welcome visitors in the future?
Tribal engagement is probably the most fundamental and important concept counterinsurgent operations in Iraq. Sheikhs, who are crux of tribal engagement strategies, have secular interests, and they are very concerned about their tribes and families. It follows that we should be concerned with sheikhs from all levels of the tribes. It boils down to this: Al-Qaeda doesn't have many resources, and they have kill lots of tribesmen. They also siphon leadership away from the tribal sheikh.
We have lots of resources, and we are still too lethal. Tribal engagement may enable us to drastically reduce military operations. Then, we can become resource allocators in Iraq instead of policemen. By empowering sheikhs through security arrangments, reconstruction, and resource allocation, we show tribesmen that we sincerely want them to live.
After a few years of tribal engagement along the lines described above, we can drastically reduce our troop presence. There is no fast forward button on this though - it's going to take many years.
When we ignore sheikhs, we dishonor them and open the door for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to co-opt disenfranchised sub tribes into the insurgency. Al-Qaeda's tribal engagement policy is easy - find which tribal leaders hate the United States, bring them money and weapons, train their men, and execute terrorist operations. Their job is small scale, and can be executed with minimal resources.
Our job is harder - we have to find and establish friendly relationships with all tribal leaders and thus prevent the occurrence of communication vacuums. It's a large scale job that is going to entail a lot of forgiving and forgetting what has happened over the last five years, especially with many Sunni tribes.
Conversations with sheikhs, backed up with good will, cooperation and follow through on the ground will save American and Iraqi lives. But, we must destroy the image of ourselves as occupiers, and start acting like guests that bring life-giving resources. It is, after all, their country, so if we're going to be there, we might as well live up to our forefathers' legacies in Europe and Japan.
I think we need to reintroduce ourselves to Iraqis, but not like politicians reintroduce themselves over and over again to America. We need to be much more genuine and sincere - it's a matter of life and death. History is watching.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Tribes and Politics
Here's an example of how to create problems:
Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "Welcome, sheikhs of the ((Al-Jubur)), ((Al-'Ubayd)), and ((Al-'Aza)).
Sheikhs: We welcome you, as well, respected Sir. We have come to ask if you have come here as a guest or as an occupier. If you say that you are our guests, we will defend you with our lives. If you say you are occupiers, then we will fight you until we are dead.
Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "We are occupiers."
______________________________________________
Something like the above conversations actually happened sometime in April of 2003.
I stood behind our officers for five years as an enlisted person, and I support them to this day with all of my efforts. With that being written, I have some criticisms that I intend to be constructive.
I have no idea what the CPA was trying to do by offending the sheikhs. The removal of Saddam and his government from power created a huge power vacuum, and we needed somebody other than Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to fill that vacuum.
What was the CPA thinking? How many lives might have been saved if we had allowed the sheikhs to fill that power vacuum while we rebuilt the central government? What would have happened if we had empowered the sheikhs to fulfill their historic role as keepers of the peace and settlers of disputes?
This is not the President's fault. I suspect it might not be entirely Paul Bremer's fault. I am done blaming people, as this is most irresponsible.
Rather, I suggest that we really start taking advantage of working with tribal leadership. It's going to cost money, but I guarantee that it will be cheaper than bailing out Wall Street.
Whose lives have been saved lately by Wall Street, anyway?
Tribal leadership has very secular and material interests to deal with. We as Americans can help in that regard, and from a strategic perspective it may help achieve many of our benevolent objectives in Iraq.
By honoring these sheikhs, we may find ourselves in the position of being able to withdraw from Iraq having left it in a better condition than it was before we came. Thus, we might leave Iraq with our honor.
"The mind is for seeing, the heart is for listening." ----Arabic Proverb
Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "Welcome, sheikhs of the ((Al-Jubur)), ((Al-'Ubayd)), and ((Al-'Aza)).
Sheikhs: We welcome you, as well, respected Sir. We have come to ask if you have come here as a guest or as an occupier. If you say that you are our guests, we will defend you with our lives. If you say you are occupiers, then we will fight you until we are dead.
Coalition Provisional Authority Guy: "We are occupiers."
______________________________________________
Something like the above conversations actually happened sometime in April of 2003.
I stood behind our officers for five years as an enlisted person, and I support them to this day with all of my efforts. With that being written, I have some criticisms that I intend to be constructive.
I have no idea what the CPA was trying to do by offending the sheikhs. The removal of Saddam and his government from power created a huge power vacuum, and we needed somebody other than Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to fill that vacuum.
What was the CPA thinking? How many lives might have been saved if we had allowed the sheikhs to fill that power vacuum while we rebuilt the central government? What would have happened if we had empowered the sheikhs to fulfill their historic role as keepers of the peace and settlers of disputes?
This is not the President's fault. I suspect it might not be entirely Paul Bremer's fault. I am done blaming people, as this is most irresponsible.
Rather, I suggest that we really start taking advantage of working with tribal leadership. It's going to cost money, but I guarantee that it will be cheaper than bailing out Wall Street.
Whose lives have been saved lately by Wall Street, anyway?
Tribal leadership has very secular and material interests to deal with. We as Americans can help in that regard, and from a strategic perspective it may help achieve many of our benevolent objectives in Iraq.
By honoring these sheikhs, we may find ourselves in the position of being able to withdraw from Iraq having left it in a better condition than it was before we came. Thus, we might leave Iraq with our honor.
"The mind is for seeing, the heart is for listening." ----Arabic Proverb
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Will Hubris Blind Us Again?
Al-Qaeda is run by very strategically savvy individuals. They are not stupid, and they are not to be underestimated. Al-Qaeda would like nothing less than for us to become drunk on what seems like victory to us in Iraq to ignoring the circumstances that can lead to failure and defeat on the global stage, including but not limited to Afghanistan.
You see, they know that when we claim victory, egos expand, and medals get pinned on swollen chests. We slap each other on the back and talk about the good old days of Abu Musa'ab Al-Zarqawi and the Islamic State of Iraq.
Al-Qaeda's leaders know that many Americans will rush to claim their share of the glory, and even politicians who were calling for pullouts a few months ago will agree that "the surge worked," and when they get into office, they can "bring home the troops" while claiming that they brought "victory to the American people in our time" in spite of the perceived errors of our current commander in chief.
With all of the dopamine running rampant in our leadership's brains, it will be easy for us to let our guards down in Iraq, thinking that the fight left and went to Afghanistan to fester there. We can really sock it to Al-Qaeda, can't we? Just one more country to go and Al-Qaeda is done! Oh, really?
Al-Qaeda is fighting a global jihad. That means car bombs in places where we don't have 150,000 troops, like Yemen or Pakistan.
The real war is that of ideas, and the battleground is our minds. Al-Qaeda's leadership understands this, and has taken into account material setbacks in Iraq and everywhere else they operate. Assuredly they have contingency plans. It takes a long time to condition minds, and what is a few decades to a Jihadist?
The material fight is wherever they can create instability and make headlines in the newspapers. Let's not think that Zawahiri and his friends are content to rot in caves in Northwestern Pakistan or wherever they are. They'd like to bring death and destruction to your neighborhood, or at least to your newspaper. It's the nature of the monster that they are. They know that they can't win militarily - but they can win in the press and on the global stage. This is just another dramatic act in the play for them.
You'd think we know these things - didn't we fund and arm them to fight against the Soviets in the 1980's? Al-Qaeda's idea of a war lasts 100 years. Our military leaders think that they can be fought and won in 12 month deployments, and our politicians think that the global war on terror will disappear when the messiah becomes president of the United States of America. Do you believe in change that much? Ayman Al-Zawahiri has a cave in Pakistan that he would like to sell you if you believe in change as much as he believes in his cause.
Let's not fall asleep and dream that we are victorious against Al-Qaeda quite yet. We are in the 3rd inning of a 9 inning game.
The battle for Afghanistan is the fourth inning. Getting Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the fifth inning. The reconstruction, development, and consolidation of Afghanistan are the 6th inning. The seventh through the ninth inning is when Islamic civilization repudiates extremism and denies it a place in their hearts and minds in favor of a better world for all of us.
You see, they know that when we claim victory, egos expand, and medals get pinned on swollen chests. We slap each other on the back and talk about the good old days of Abu Musa'ab Al-Zarqawi and the Islamic State of Iraq.
Al-Qaeda's leaders know that many Americans will rush to claim their share of the glory, and even politicians who were calling for pullouts a few months ago will agree that "the surge worked," and when they get into office, they can "bring home the troops" while claiming that they brought "victory to the American people in our time" in spite of the perceived errors of our current commander in chief.
With all of the dopamine running rampant in our leadership's brains, it will be easy for us to let our guards down in Iraq, thinking that the fight left and went to Afghanistan to fester there. We can really sock it to Al-Qaeda, can't we? Just one more country to go and Al-Qaeda is done! Oh, really?
Al-Qaeda is fighting a global jihad. That means car bombs in places where we don't have 150,000 troops, like Yemen or Pakistan.
The real war is that of ideas, and the battleground is our minds. Al-Qaeda's leadership understands this, and has taken into account material setbacks in Iraq and everywhere else they operate. Assuredly they have contingency plans. It takes a long time to condition minds, and what is a few decades to a Jihadist?
The material fight is wherever they can create instability and make headlines in the newspapers. Let's not think that Zawahiri and his friends are content to rot in caves in Northwestern Pakistan or wherever they are. They'd like to bring death and destruction to your neighborhood, or at least to your newspaper. It's the nature of the monster that they are. They know that they can't win militarily - but they can win in the press and on the global stage. This is just another dramatic act in the play for them.
You'd think we know these things - didn't we fund and arm them to fight against the Soviets in the 1980's? Al-Qaeda's idea of a war lasts 100 years. Our military leaders think that they can be fought and won in 12 month deployments, and our politicians think that the global war on terror will disappear when the messiah becomes president of the United States of America. Do you believe in change that much? Ayman Al-Zawahiri has a cave in Pakistan that he would like to sell you if you believe in change as much as he believes in his cause.
Let's not fall asleep and dream that we are victorious against Al-Qaeda quite yet. We are in the 3rd inning of a 9 inning game.
The battle for Afghanistan is the fourth inning. Getting Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the fifth inning. The reconstruction, development, and consolidation of Afghanistan are the 6th inning. The seventh through the ninth inning is when Islamic civilization repudiates extremism and denies it a place in their hearts and minds in favor of a better world for all of us.
Saturday, September 13, 2008
Which ((Albu 'Ubayd)) are you talking about?
Unfortunately, when dealing with Iraqi Arab sub-tribes, ((Albu 'Ubayd)) is not ((Albu 'Ubayd)). Why? Each Iraqi main tribe consists of sub-tribes of different sizes. Each sub-tribe can consist of sub-tribes that belong to it. Some main tribes, such as the ((Al-Muntafaq)) consist of over 800 sub-tribes! Some of these sub-tribes have exactly the same first name!
Here's most if not all of the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) Iraqi Arab sub-tribes, some of which belong to different main tribes. Others are from the same main tribe, but different branches! Note that each of these sub-tribes has a different tribal name chain. There are six ((Al-Muntafaq)) sub-tribal name chains that begin with ((Albu 'Ubayd)), but each one represents a different sub-tribe.
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Husayn)) ((Al-Khamis)) ((Al-A’ajib)) ((Bani Hajim)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Mahdi)) ((Albu Mahaydi)) ((Albu Baz)) ((Al-Samara’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Siriya)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Ja’afara)) ((Al-'Ankabi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Kari’at)) ((Al-Luhayb)) ((Al-Juburi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khanif)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khatibat)) ((Al-Ibrahim)) ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Malahma)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Shabana)) ((Al-Akra’a)) ((Al-Shimmari)) ((Al-Ta’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Zur)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Ajil)) aka ((Al-‘Ajili))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
So what, you may ask? Each has a separate sheikh or mukhtar! These sheikhs and mukhtars are central to our efforts to work with the Iraqi population.
And, let's be careful not confuse them with the ((Al-'Ubayd)) main tribe, with hundreds of sub-tribes of its own!
Be careful navigating the Iraqi Arab tribal networks, because the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) is not the ((Albu 'Ubayd)). In actuality, the Iraq Arab Tribal System is a dizzying collection of groups within groups. Mastering this system is vital to the United States' success in Iraq.
Here's most if not all of the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) Iraqi Arab sub-tribes, some of which belong to different main tribes. Others are from the same main tribe, but different branches! Note that each of these sub-tribes has a different tribal name chain. There are six ((Al-Muntafaq)) sub-tribal name chains that begin with ((Albu 'Ubayd)), but each one represents a different sub-tribe.
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Husayn)) ((Al-Khamis)) ((Al-A’ajib)) ((Bani Hajim)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Mahdi)) ((Albu Mahaydi)) ((Albu Baz)) ((Al-Samara’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Albu Siriya)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Ja’afara)) ((Al-'Ankabi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Kari’at)) ((Al-Luhayb)) ((Al-Juburi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khanif)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Khatibat)) ((Al-Ibrahim)) ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Malahma)) ((Albu Radayni)) ((Al-Sabti))((Al-Dulaymi))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Shabana)) ((Al-Akra’a)) ((Al-Shimmari)) ((Al-Ta’i))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Al-Zur)) ((Al-Khafaji)) ((Al-Ajwad)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Ajil)) aka ((Al-‘Ajili))
((Albu ‘Ubayd)) ((Bani ‘Aridh)) ((Al-Jabsha)) ((Al-Muntafaq))
So what, you may ask? Each has a separate sheikh or mukhtar! These sheikhs and mukhtars are central to our efforts to work with the Iraqi population.
And, let's be careful not confuse them with the ((Al-'Ubayd)) main tribe, with hundreds of sub-tribes of its own!
Be careful navigating the Iraqi Arab tribal networks, because the ((Albu 'Ubayd)) is not the ((Albu 'Ubayd)). In actuality, the Iraq Arab Tribal System is a dizzying collection of groups within groups. Mastering this system is vital to the United States' success in Iraq.
Where Is Prime Minister Nuri ((Al-Maliki))'s real power base?
The ((Al-Muntafaq)) has 832 original, non-attached known Iraqi sub-tribes out of the 4492 total in The Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix (TIATM™). The ((Al-Muntafaq)) tribal confederation therefore represents about 18.5% of TIATM™, and it can be assessed that their tribal leadership represents the largest segment of Iraqi society.
Does this mean that approximately one in five Iraqi Arabs is from the ((Al-Muntafaq)) confederation?
The vote that put him in the prime ministership may indeed have been more accurate than the opposition wishes to admit. Most political analysts believe that PM Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) was selected as a compromise candidate due to the fact that he was neither a Sadrist nor a member of SCIRI. While this indeed may be the case, it doesn’t cancel out the fact that the Prime Minister needed a large power base from which to operate. In
It bears noting that the ((Al-Tikriti)) confederation, from which sprang the former dictator Saddam Husayn Majid ((Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Tikriti)), represents about .5% of The Iraqi Arab Tribal Matrix(tm). It seems that the 2006 elections were indeed democratic, as one of the smallest Arab tribal confederations in Iraq was replaced by the ((Al-Muntafaq)) confederation, which is the largest.
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